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 Capital and Liquidity Ratios and Financial Distress. 
Evidence from the European Banking Industry 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using a large bank-level dataset, we test the relevance of both structural liquidity and capital ratios 
as defined in Basel III on banks’ probability of failure. To include all relevant episodes of bank 
failure and distress (F&D) occurring in the EU-28 member states over the past decade, we develop 
a broad indicator that includes information not only on bankruptcies, liquidations, under 
receivership and dissolved banks, but also accounts for state interventions, mergers in distress and 
EBA stress test results. Estimates from several versions of the logistic probability model indicate 
that the likelihood of failure and distress decreases with increased liquidity holdings, while capital 
ratios are significant only for large banks. Our results provide support for Basel III’s initiatives on 
structural liquidity and for the increased regulatory focus on large and systemically important 
banks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis lead to a broad consensus that capital and liquidity holdings are equally 
important to promote the safety and soundness of banks. This has prompted a revision of the 
existing regulatory framework, which resulted in the introduction of liquidity standards in the Basel 
III capital adequacy framework. While capital regulation aims to limit banks’ insolvency risk by 
increasing their loss-absorbing capacity, liquidity regulation aims to minimise banks’ maturity 
mismatch, to limit funding risk and market liquidity risk. Although theoretically more liquid and 
better-capitalised banks should also be safer banks, in practice these requirements might trigger 
changes in risk management, decrease bank profitability and ultimately increase bank risk taking 
propensity. While there is a substantial literature on the effectiveness of capital measures in 
predicting bank distress, little is known about the impact of the new structural liquidity measures. In 
addition, empirical evidence on how the combination of mandatory capital and liquidity ratios 
actually impacts on bank stability is limited.  
This paper contributes to the emerging strand of the literature on the potential impact of the 
introduction of minimum liquidity ratios (King, 2013; Hong et al, 2014; Dietrich et al, 2015) and 
investigates the effectiveness of the Basel III bank capital and liquidity measures in reducing bank 
failures and distress. In particular, we consider the relationship between the newly proposed 
measure of structural liquidity, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), and subsequent bank 
probability of default. We also contribute to the broader literature on bank liquidity management, 
which builds on the works of Kashyap et al (2002), Gatev and Strahan (2006), Gatev et al (2009) 
and has recently considered whether banks advantage as liquidity providers has failed during the 
financial crisis (Acharya and Mora, 2015). 
Focusing on a sample of banks headquartered in the EU-28 member states over the period 2004-
2013, we aim to answer the following questions: (i) are higher structural liquidity ratios decreasing 
banks’ subsequent probability of default? (ii) are structural liquidity and capital ratios 
complementary in promoting bank stability? and (iii) is the relationship between liquidity and 
capital ratios and banks’ probability of failure different for large banks? 
To answer these questions we first examine the relationship between the Basel III capital and 
liquidity ratios and episodes of bank failure and distress. Our NSFR is computed following both the 
final version of October 2014 and the original document of December 2010, in order to assess the 
impact of changes in regulatory definitions. As proxy of capital, we use alternatively a non-risk-
weighted indicator, i.e. the ratio of equity to total assets (as a proxy of the leverage ratio), and two 
risk-based measures, i.e. Tier1 capital ratio and Total regulatory capital ratio. 
Given that outright bank failures in the EU have been extremely low, we develop a broad indicator 
of bank failure to include all relevant episodes of distress occurring in EU member states over the 
past decade. Following Betz et al. (2014), we collect information not only on bankruptcies, 
liquidations, under receivership and dissolved episodes, but we also take into account state 
interventions and mergers in distress. We subsequently analyse whether the link between capital 
and liquidity indicators and the probability of failure and distress differs for large banks by focusing 
on the 123 banks observed by European Banking Authority (EBA) in the EU-wide 2014 stress 
testing exercise. In this instance, our definition of failed and distressed banks takes also into account 
EBA information for banks that did not overcome stress tests.  
Following the exiting literature (see Poghosyan and Čihák, 2011; Distinguin et al., 2013; DeYoung 
and Torna, 2013), to evaluate the relationship between Basel III liquidity and capital measures and 
bank failures and distress, we use several versions of the logistic probability model.  
This paper makes several contributions to the related literature. To the best of our knowledge, it is 
the first study to estimate bank structural liquidity ratios by employing the final version of the 
NSFR (October 2014). In addition, we compare the ratios obtained following the 2014 specification 
to those obtained following the initial 2010 specification. This allows us to validate the 
effectiveness of the new rules proposed by the BCBS and therefore to provide evidence to support 
the regulatory effort. Our second contribution relates to the geographical coverage of sample banks. 
This is one of a handful of studies that focuses exclusively on episodes of failure and distress 
among EU banks (see Poghosyan and Čihák, 2011; and Betz et al., 2014). This most likely reflects 
the fact that the number of outright bank failures in EU countries is relatively low and some EU 
countries experienced no bank failures. Indeed, the large majority of studies on the determinants of 
bank failures focus on the US, both because of numerous episodes of bank failures and because of 
the detailed information available for US banks (see Lane et al., 1986; Cole and Gunther, 1995; 
Calomiris and Mason, 2000; Estrella et al., 2000; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; and Hong et al., 
2014). 
Departing from previous studies, our definition of failed and distressed banks also takes into 
account state interventions, mergers in distress and the EBA stress tests results. This enables us to 
consider all troubled EU banks, not only those that failed. Finally, the data covers a timeframe that 
allows us to investigate bank funding structure and capital dynamics in the run up to, during and 
after the global financial and eurozone crises, providing the first evidence on the impact of crises on 
sources of distress for individual banks.  
The main results of the empirical analysis can be summarised as follows. We find that capital and 
liquidity ratios play a complementary role in ensuring bank soundness, but only for the largest 
banking groups. When considering the full sample, our results indicate that, among the target 
variables, only the NSFR is a significant determinant of banking sector fragility in the EU. This 
result is consistent with the view that during the global financial crisis the key source of bank 
instability was excessive maturity transformation (see Gobat et al., 2014). Indeed, banks that ran 
into difficulty almost always had low NSFR, although their capital requirements were well above 
the statutory minimum (see BCBS, 2014). Moreover, we show that only the new final version of the 
NSFR (October 2014) has predictive power, whereas the original version (December 2010) does 
not. This finding implies that the recent changes on the calibration of the NSFR are effective in 
terms of improving bank stability. Finally, considering only large banks, we find that both Basel III 
liquidity and capital standards are significant in reducing bank probability of default. Hence, the 
results support the Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and capital, but only for the largest 
banking groups. This is in line with the major emphasis placed by the BCBS on global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs). 
The findings of the analysis are of particular interest to both academics and policy makers as they 
contribute to the current debate on the effectiveness of the combined role of liquidity and capital 
cushions in promoting bank stability, especially for the largest banks. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the bank capital and 
liquidity rules of Basel III and Section 3 reviews the relevant literature. Section 4 describes the 
sample and discusses the methodology and our identification of failure and distress events. It also 
presents our variables of interest and the controls used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 and 6 
present the empirical results and the robustness tests. Section 7 concludes and offers some policy 
implications. 
2. Basel III capital and liquidity requirements and bank stability  
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), in the December 2010 final document (the 
so-called Basel III accord), set the introduction of liquidity standards for banks and added a 
leverage ratio to the revised risk-weighted capital buffers, introduced in Basel II.1  
The capital standards and new capital buffers will require banks to hold more and higher quality 
capital than under Basel II. The enhanced capital ratios prescribed by the BCBS relate to the ratio of 
a firm’s eligible regulatory capital divided by a regulatory prescribed calculation of risk-weighted 
asset. In addition to strengthened capital requirements, the Basel III framework introduced a non-
risk-weighted leverage ratio (capital to asset ratio), which has been designed to supplement risk-
based minimum capital requirements (i.e. Tier1 Capital Ratio and Total Regulatory Capital Ratio) 
to ensure that adequate funding is maintained in case of crisis. This is a supplemental 3% non-risk 
based leverage ratio, which serves as a backstop to the measures outlined above. 
                                                          
1  Being a new and complex set of rules, a full analysis of the regulatory changes proposed under the Basel III 
framework is outside the scope of this paper. 
Furthermore, the BCBS (2010) developed two quantitative measures for liquidity: the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR), which aims to ensure that banks have enough liquid assets to withstand 
liquidity stress in the short term, and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), which aims to 
encourage banks to hold more stable and longer term funding sources against their liquid assets, 
thereby reducing maturity transformation risk. The two liquidity ratios are required to be above 100 
per cent. The Basel III liquidity standards have undergone substantial revisions since they were first 
issued in December 2010. With respect to the NSFR, the overall aim of these changes was to ensure 
that the indicator reflected a bank’s structural liquidity risk rather than it being calculated for stress 
testing purposes only. These changes include greater differentiation in terms of maturity, to allow 
for the prompt identification of banks with excessive maturity mismatches and more fragile funding 
structures (BCBS, 2014).  
More specifically, the NSFR is the ratio between the amount of Available Stable Funding (ASF) 
relative to the amount of Required Stable Funding (RSF): 
 
𝑁𝐹𝑆𝑅 =  
𝐴𝑆𝐹
𝑅𝑆𝐹
                                                         (1)                                                                
The ASF comprises weighted liabilities reflecting their contractual maturity and is defined as the 
portion of capital and liabilities expected to be a reliable source of funding over a one-year time 
horizon. The RSF of a specific bank is a function of the liquidity characteristics and residual 
maturities of the various assets held by that institution as well as those of its off-balance sheet 
(OBS) exposures (BCBS, 2014). The ASF and RSF are calibrated to reflect the presumed degree of 
stability of a bank’s liabilities and liquidity of a bank’s assets. The weights for assets and liabilities 
range from 0% to 100%; these are primarily the result of internationally agreed definitions and 
calibrations (see Equation 2).  
𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑇𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 + (𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠&𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 ∗ 95%) + (𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 90%) + (𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 & 𝑆𝑇 𝐵𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 50%)
(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 5%) + (𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ 50%) + (𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 & 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑇𝑜 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 ∗ 50%) + (𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 ∗ 65%) + (𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙&𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 ∗ 85%) + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 + (𝑂𝐵𝑆 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 ∗ 5%)
 
(2) 
 
For example, the NSFR is generally calibrated such that longer-term liabilities are assumed to be 
more stable than short-term liabilities and that short-term retail deposits are more stable than 
wholesale funding of the same maturity from other counterparties. While the level of detail 
necessary to estimate the NSFR is not publicly available, we can approximate the ratio consistently 
with the BCBS guidelines. Table A.1 in the Appendix illustrates the calibrations we used, following 
both the 2010 and the 2014 documents, and the relevant balance sheet items considered for the 
estimation of the NSFR. 
Banks can achieve the required NSRF ratios either by implementing strategies aimed at increasing 
ASF or decreasing RSF or, most likely, a combination of both (see King, 2013, for a discussion of 
the complementary or alternative strategies aimed at increasing the NSFR). These strategies are 
likely to impact banks’ liquidity management function, given the stronger emphasis on holdings of 
liquid assets, in particular of government securities. Allen et al. (2012) discuss the potential 
economic impact of the Basel III regulatory changes, especially in terms of the possible 
restructuring of banks’ balance sheets towards more liquid assets and consequent impact on the 
availability of credit. Covas and Driscoll (2014) develop a general equilibrium to study the 
macroeconomic impact of introducing a minimum liquidity standard for banks on top of existing 
capital adequacy requirements. They suggest that the introduction of a minimum liquidity 
requirement would lead to a decline in loans by about 3 percent and an increase in securities over 6 
percent. As the introduction liquidity regulation could prevent banks from fully exploiting their 
profit opportunities, they would reduce the supply of bank loans and increases the cost of funds. 
This, in turn, would lead to decreased aggregate output and decreased consumption. In contrast, 
Dietrich et al (2014)’s empirical evidence indicates that the introduction of the NFSR is likely to 
have little impact on bank performance, measured by the return on assets, return on equity and net 
interest margin.    
Despite the potential costs, the primary aims of the new regulations is to ensure banks’ stability. 
While both capital and liquidity holdings are important for the safety and soundness of banks, little 
is known about the way the newly introduced liquidity standards interact with capital buffers. 
Liquidity and solvency are closely interrelated; however they are not perfect substitutes. All else 
being equal, better-capitalised banks require less liquidity. Higher capitalisation might increase 
depositors and investors’ confidence and therefore allow banks easier (and cheaper) access to short 
term funding. However, a strong capital position is not sufficient to address liquidity risk and banks 
still need to hold liquidity buffers, regardless of their capital positions. As the global financial crisis 
has shown, even well capitalised banks may have difficulties in accessing short term funding during 
turbulent financial conditions. On the other hand, higher liquidity buffers can compensate for lower 
capital when a bank is facing difficulties. There are a number of channels through which liquidity 
standards can interact with capital measures (Farag et al, 2013; ECB, 2014). Banks can increase the 
NSFR by decreasing the amount of risky and illiquid assets and replace them with liquid assets, 
leading to an improvement in capital ratios. In addition, the cost of increasing the NSFR should 
decrease as capital ratios improve, highlighting synergies between the two indicators (ECB, 2014). 
In sum, while capital and liquidity are equally important in ensuring bank stability, the interactions 
among them are still unclear. In addition, both banks and regulators will seek an optimal 
combination of capital and liquidity that minimises the risk of financial distress while limiting the 
costs of holding excessive buffers which could be detrimental to banks’ financial intermediation 
function. 
3. Literature Review  
Capital ratios have long been a valuable regulatory tool for assessing the safety and soundness of 
banks. In particular, as US regulators use CAMELS ratings to assess bank conditions, a number of 
studies have used proxies for capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings, 
liquidity, and sensitivity as predictors of bank failures. The earlier studies (Cole and Gunther, 1995; 
Estrella et al., 2000; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; DeYoung, 2003) use data on US financial 
institutions during the savings and loan crisis (S&Ls) of the 1980s and early 1990s. More recently, 
a number of studies have applied the same framework to the analysis bank failures during the global 
financial crisis (Cole and White, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Altunbas et al., 2015). These 
studies consistently identify a robust set of bank failure predictors, including aggressive loan growth 
and excessive reliance on short-term market funding. In addition, low quality assets (high levels of 
non-performing loans), low profitability and low capitalisation are linked to the accumulation of 
risk. The extant literature suggests that better capitalised banks fared better during the global 
financial crisis.  Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) find that during the crisis, a stronger capital position 
was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks. They also 
find the relationship to be stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the 
risk-adjusted capital ratio. Similar results were reported by Beltratti and Stultz (2012). However, the 
relationship between capital and risk might be non linear, as both very low and very high levels of 
capital induce banks to take on more risk (Altunbas et al., 2015). In practice, higher levels of capital 
may reflect regulators’ efforts to encourage riskier banks to hold higher buffers. Delis and 
Staikouras (2011) find some evidence of a positive relationship between higher levels of bank 
capital and risk. Mayes and Stremmel (2014), focusing on FDIC-insured US banks from 1992 to 
2012, compare risk-based and non-risked-weighted measures of capital. They find that the non-
risked-weighted capital measure, the leverage ratio, explains bank distress and failures best and 
with considerable accuracy.  
A handful of recent studies focus on the ability of the new Basel III capital ratios or of the new 
liquidity standards to reduce bank failures. The study closer to ours is Vazquez and Federico 
(2015). They study the connection between structural liquidity and leverage in bank balance sheets 
in the run-up to the global financial crisis, and the likelihood of subsequent failure. Focusing on a 
sample of US and European banks over the period 2001-2009, they show the complementary nature 
of these two ratios. Banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage ratios in the pre-
crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. Vazquez and Federico (2015) also find evidence of 
systematic differences across bank types. Smaller banks were more susceptible to failure because of 
liquidity problems, while the large cross-border banking groups typically failed because of 
insufficient capital buffers. Hong et al. (2014) consider a sample of US commercial banks over the 
period 2001-2011 to examine potential links between Basel III liquidity risk measures and bank 
failures. They find that both the NSFR and LCR have limited effects on bank failures.  
This brief review of the literature demonstrates that empirical work on the connection between 
Basel III liquidity and capital buffers and banks’ subsequent probability of failure is still 
developing. We build on the existing literature and investigate whether higher capital and liquidity 
holdings contribute to decreasing banks’ probability of failure. 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
This study focuses on all banks, both active and non-active, headquartered in the EU-28 member 
states. This allows us to include banks that failed or were acquired during the sample period (2004 – 
2013). The 10-year time span enables us to take into account the numerous distress episodes that 
characterised many EU banks during the global financial crisis and subsequent eurozone crisis. Our 
empirical analysis is carried out using annual consolidated bank statements from the Bureau Van 
Dijk’s BankScope database.2 The analysis focuses only on those EU banks with available data to 
compute our variables of interest (the Basel III capital and liquidity ratios).3 Overall our sample 
includes 513 banks, with 1,982 bank-year observations in total. Table A.2 in the Appendix presents 
the distribution of banks by country and the representativeness of the sample. We compare 
aggregate total assets of our sample banks over the time period of investigation with the aggregate 
total assets of the whole banking system. In line with Distinguin et al. (2013), the final sample 
constitutes over 56 per cent of the EU banking sector assets over the sample period. The 
representativeness of the sample increases in more recent years (74% of the total EU banking sector 
                                                          
2 Most of the information available on distress episodes (our dependent variable) is relative to banking groups. This is 
also consistent with the application of the Basel III liquidity rules at the highest level of consolidation. 
3 The estimation of the Basel III capital and liquidity ratios is data demanding in terms of the granularity of the balance 
sheet items necessary for the calibration of the ratios. A number of banks does not report to BankScope with the 
required level of detail, simply because these measures were not mandatory before the new regulation proposed by the 
BCBS (2010). Missing values in the relevant accounting variables are present for banks in all categories, size, 
specialisation, ownership, etc.  
assets in 2013, see Table A.2), due to the improved reporting of more granular information for the 
relevant balance sheet items post crisis, in line with the new regulatory requirements. 
Next, we focus on the 123 EU banks observed by EBA in the EU-wide stress testing 2014.4 The 
EBA stress test is designed to provide supervisors, market participants and institutions with 
consistent data to “contrast and compare EU-banks' resilience under adverse market conditions”. 
This subsample allows us to investigate whether the relationship between the Basel III capital and 
liquidity standards and subsequent bank failure is different for the EU largest banks. This is in line 
with the major emphasis placed by the BCBS on global systemically important banks. All large 
banks have information available and therefore we can include all the EBA banks in our analysis. 
Table A.2 in the Appendix illustrates the distribution of large banks by country.  
4.2 Empirical Methodology  
To study the relation between bank failure and Basel III liquidity and capital measures, we use a 
pooled logit model.5 The model has the following log-likelihood function: 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿 = ∑ ∑ {𝑌𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝐹(𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡−1)] + (1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡)𝑙𝑜𝑔[1 − 𝐹(𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡−1)]}
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1                                 (3) 
 
where Yit is a binary variable that takes value of 1 when a bank i fails or experiences financial 
distressed in time period t and 0 otherwise. Following Poghosyan and Čihak (2011), we estimate the 
probability of default (PD) as a function of lagged explanatory variables Xit-1. F(β′Xit-1) is the 
cumulative probability distribution function evaluated at β′Xit-1. We assume that the probability 
distribution function is logistic.  β is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.  
                                                          
4 The 2014 stress test exercise included 123 banking groups across the EU (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, 
Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, United Kingdom) and including Norway with a total of EUR 28,000BN of assets covering 
more than 70 per cent of total EU banking assets (see EBA, 2014). The list of EU banks subjected to the 2014 stress test 
exercise is available at www.eba.europa.eu. 
5 Pooled logit models have been widely used in the literature. See, among others, Kumar et al., 2003; Fuertes and 
Kalotychou, 2007; Davis and Karim, 2008; Poghosyan and Čihak, 2011; LoDuca and Peltonen, 2013; Sarlin and 
Peltonen, 2013; and Betz et al., 2014. See Fuertes and Kalotychou (2006) and Davis and Karim (2008) for a discussion 
on the appropriateness of a pooled approach. As a robustness check, we also run our estimations also using a probit 
specification. We obtain qualitatively similar results. 
 4.3 Identifying Failed and Distressed Banks (F&D) 
Our identification process starts with the Bureau Van Dijk’s BankScope database. BankScope 
assigns a status to a bank that can take the following forms: (i) active; (ii) under receivership; (iii) 
bankruptcy; (iv) dissolved; (v) dissolved by merger; (vi) in liquidation. 6  
We classify a bank as failed and distressed (F&D) if it satisfies at least one of the following three 
conditions during our sample period (2004-2013). 7 The first condition is that a formerly active bank 
changes its status to under receivership, bankruptcy, dissolved, or in liquidation. The second 
condition regards banks that change their status to ‘dissolved by merger’, with one important 
caveat. Unlike the majority of related studies (Poghosyan and Čihák, 2011; Vazquez and Federico, 
2015), we do not automatically include banks dissolved by merger in the F&D banks’ definition. 
This is because mergers and acquisitions (M&As) might have been carried out for strategic reasons 
rather than for rescuing troubled banks (Arena, 2008). For this reason, following Betz et al. (2014), 
banks with status ‘dissolved by merger’ are classified as F&D banks only if they have a coverage 
ratio (defined as the ratio of total equity and loan loss reserve minus non-performing loans to total 
assets, CR) smaller than 0 during the twelve months prior to the M&A. Finally, a bank is classified 
as F&D if it receives state aid during the period considered. State aid can take different forms such 
                                                          
6  BankScope defines: ‘under receivership’ those banks that remain active, though they are in administration or 
receivership; ‘bankruptcy’ those banks that no longer exist because they have ceased their activities since they are in the 
process of bankruptcy; ‘dissolved’ those banks that no longer exist as a legal entity; ‘dissolved by merger’ those banks 
that no longer exist as a legal entity because they have been included in a merger; ‘in liquidation’ those banks that no 
longer exist because they have ceased their activities, since they are in the process of liquidation. In BankScope there 
are also the three following type of bank status: ‘active, no longer with accounts on BankScope’ that are banks still 
active, though their accounts are no longer updated on BankScope following an acquisition by another bank with 
accounts on BankScope integrating the accounts of its subsidiary in its consolidated accounts; ‘dissolved by demerger’, 
that are banks no longer exist as a legal entity. The reason for this is a demerger, the bank has been split; and ‘inactive’, 
these are banks no longer active and the precise reason for inactivity is unknown. In our analysis we don’t consider 
these latter banks, as they do not return the necessary information. 
7 To check the robustness of our identification of F&D, we use a complementary methodology that allows us to identify 
technical failure banks. Following, Cole and White (2012) we count as a technical failure any bank reporting the sum of 
equity plus loan loss reserves as less than half of the value of its non-performing assets. We find that Cole and White’s 
methodology gives the same results as those obtained using BankScope’s information. 
as: nationalisation, recapitalisation, guarantee lines, loans, etc. Data on state aid are collected from 
the database provided by Mediobanca (2013). 8 
For our subsample of large banks, the definition of our dependent variable (F&D banks) also takes 
into account the EBA information for those banks that did not overcome the 2014 stress testing 
exercise.  
Panel A of Table 1 illustrates the sample composition by bank status (active banks versus F&D) for 
the EU-28 member states during the period 2004–2013. We identify 292 F&D events for 106 
banks.9 The number of F&D banks in EU countries over the sample period is relatively low and 
some EU countries had no episodes of bank failures or distress.10 In particular, Panel A of Table 1 
shows that the highest number of cases of distress episodes (compared to the total number of banks 
in each country) occurred in Denmark and Greece, followed by Ireland, Belgium, Italy and Spain. 
This result is to some extent expected because Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain had the most 
vulnerable banking sectors during the sovereign debt crisis. The Danish banking system was also 
severely affected by the crisis due to a strong presence of subsidiaries in Ireland (for example, 
Danske Bank). Concerning Belgium, two large banks, Fortis and Dexia experienced severe troubles. 
Other countries that experienced a relatively high number of bank failure and distress events are the 
United Kingdom, Austria and Portugal. The banking systems of France, Germany and the 
Netherlands show the lowest ratio of F&D banks on total banks. The low percentage of distressed 
banks in Germany is consistent with the evidence provided by Dam and Kotter (2012). Most of the 
banks that failed the EBA 2014 stress tests had already been identified as F&D in the previous step 
(see Table 1, column II). However, the EBA information allows us to add 12 F&D episodes. 
                                                          
8 Mediobanca is an Italian investment bank whose research department actively collects and publishes data on the 
banking industry. For each European country considered, the Mediobanca database includes details of all rescue 
operations. The Mediobanca database is based on official sources: the accounts of individual institutions, the official 
documents of the European Commission or of the national central banks. 
9 The number of banks is smaller than the number of F&D events, since some banks experienced multiple distress 
events over time. 
10 Due to the small number of failed EU banks over the period 2004-2013, it is not possible to consider failed and 
distressed banks separately. 
Particularly relevant for example is the case of Cyprus, where only applying the EBA screening we 
identify 3 banks as F&D. 
Regarding the temporal distribution of F&D events, Panel B of Table 1 indicates that the majority 
of bank distress events in the EU took place mainly during the financial crises (96 per cent of all 
cases of bank failure and distress). This pattern is analogous to what happened in the US, where 
more than 500 commercial banks under FDIC supervision went bankrupt between 2008 and 2013 
compared to less than 50 between 2001 and 2007. 11 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
4.4 Capital and liquidity indicators 
Our target variables are the Basel III capital and structural liquidity standards. To measure bank 
capital, we compute a non-risk-weighted leverage ratio, equal to equity to total assets (ETA), and 
two risk-based measures: Tier1 capital ratio (defined as the ratio of Tier1 capital to risk weighted 
assets - TIER1RATIO), and total regulatory capital ratio (defined as the ratio of Tier1 and Tier2 
capital to risk weighted assets - TRCR). These proxies are broadly used in literature (see Betz et al., 
2014; Mayes and Stremmel, 2014; Vazquez and Federico, 2015). Due to multicollinearity between 
the capital explanatory variables (ETA, TIER1RATIO and TRCR), we perform the logistic 
estimations using the three capital ratios alternatively. We expect an increase of ETA (i.e. lower 
leverage), TIER1RATIO or TRCR to correspond to a decrease of F&D probability. 
As for the structural liquidity ratio, we use the NSFR. Because of the evolving nature of the Basel 
III liquidity standards, we calculate two versions: NSFR2014, based on the final version of October 
2014, and NSFR2010, based on the original document of December 2010. Table A.1 in the 
Appendix summarises the weights and calibrations for each asset and liability items in both NSFR 
versions. Table A.1 also shows the key changes from the NSFR published in December 2010. Since 
BankScope does not cover all the detailed information specified in Basel III, we assess the NSFR 
                                                          
11 See http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. 
using the following assumption. Given that we can not split the loan portfolios according to their 
residual maturity, which under Basel III entails different weights, corporate and retail loans are 
treated relatively conservatively (see Gobat et al., 2014), with all these types of loans assumed to 
have a maturity of more than 1 year and hence a RSF weight of 85 per cent.12  We expect a negative 
relationship between our structural liquidity measure and the probability of bank failure and 
distress, whereby a higher NSFR is associated with lower liquidity risk and hence greater bank 
stability. Table A.3 in the Appendix describes our target variables and their hypothesised 
relationships with the dependent binary variable (F&D). 
 
4.5 Other determinants of bank failure and distress 
In line with the extant literature, we also control for a set variables traditionally considered 
predictors of bank failure. Recent studies investigating the determinants of bank failure, mainly 
focusing on US banks, have reported a high predictive power for the traditional CAMELS 
indicators (Betz et al., 2104). 13  We therefore start by considering the remaining CAMELS 
indicators. The first covariate is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL_GL) as a 
proxy for asset quality. A higher ratio of NPL_GL indicates lower quality of the bank loan 
portfolio. Hence, an increase in NPL_GL should lead to an increase in the probability of bank 
failure and distress. 
Next, we include the cost-to-income ratio (CIR) as a proxy for bank operational efficiency. Since 
low values of CIR indicate better managerial quality, the relationship between CIR and the 
probability of bank failure and distress is expected to be positive. 
                                                          
12 Basel III establishes a RSF weight of 50 per cent for corporate and retail loans with a residual maturity of less than 
one year, and a RSF weight of 85 per cent for those with a residual maturity of one year or more. 
13  CAMELS is the abbreviation for the components of a supervisory assessment of a bank's condition: Capital 
adequacy; Asset quality; Management quality; Earnings; Liquidity; Sensitivity to market risk.  
Furthermore, to measure bank earnings we consider the return on average assets (ROAA). 14 We 
expect a negative sign for the relation between ROAA and F&D probability, since an increase in 
profitability should reduce the likelihood of a failure and distress event.  
In addition to the CAMELS covariates, we also incorporate a set of other control variables. We 
include a proxy for bank diversification and following Stiroh (2004) we measure it by the ratio of 
non-interest income to net operating revenue (DIV). We expect a negative relation between DIV 
and the F&D probability, because diversification should lead to risk reduction and therefore lower 
the likelihood of failure and distress. On the other hand, increased reliance on non-interest income 
might be an indicator of a riskier business model. 
Furthermore, we consider the natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets to proxy for bank size 
(SIZE). The sign linking SIZE to the probability of bank failure and distress is uncertain. The 
relationship can be interpreted negatively when asset growth leads to efficiency gains (scale and 
scope efficiency), which should result in higher bank stability. On the other hand, the relationship 
may become positive if large banks follow diversification strategies that increase their risk exposure 
(Allen and Jagtiani, 2000) and higher volatility of earnings (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; DeJonghe, 
2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010) while relying on the implicit guarantee associated with 
the too-big-to-fail argument. 
In addition to bank-specific controls, we include macroeconomic variables and a measure of market 
concentration (Männasoo and Mayes, 2009; Betz et al., 2014). We include the annual percentage 
change of gross domestic product (GDPC) and the annual inflation rate (INFC). We expected that 
low GDP growth and high inflation increase bank vulnerability. Hence, we hypothesise a negative 
sign for GDPC and a positive sign for INFC. 
To measure the degree of banking system concentration, we consider the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (hereafter HHI). The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared market share value (in term 
of total assets) of all banks in the country. The theoretical relationship linking HHI to bank survival 
                                                          
14 As a robustness test, we also consider the Return on Average Equity (ROAE) and we obtained very similar results in 
the regressions. 
is uncertain. Some studies focus on bank liabilities and predict a negative relationship between 
market concentration and banks’ risk of failure (see Allen and Gale, 2000, 2004; Carletti, 2008; 
Beck et al., 2013). Other focus on the loan market and suggest a positive association between 
market concentration and bank risk taking (see Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005). Finally, we include a 
eurozone dummy variable (dummy_EuroZone), which takes the value of 1 if a bank belongs to the 
euro area and 0 otherwise. We expect a positive sign given that the eurozone area includes the 
countries most affected by the sovereign debt crisis. Table A.3 in the appendix describes the 
explanatory variables outlined above and their hypothesised relationships with the dependent binary 
variable of bank failure and distress.  
 
4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
For each sample bank, we compute our capital and liquidity ratios as described in Section 4.4. Table 
2 reports the descriptive statistics relating to our variables of interest for the F&D and active banks 
in each year. 15  With reference to the capital variables (see Panel A), we find that ETA average 
values of F&D banks are always lower than those of the healthy banks. On the other hand, 
TIER1RATIO and TRCR average values of troubled banks are similar to those of sound banks.  
Focusing on our structural liquidity indicator, we find that, in all period observed, F&D banks show 
NSFR average values significantly lower than those of active banks, especially during the more 
recent years (see Panel B of Table 2). Moreover, the NSFR average values of F&D banks are 
consistently below the Basel III threshold of 100 per cent over the period 2004-2013. Conversely, 
the NSFR average values of active banks are significantly above the minimum required, with a 
tendency to increase in more recent years. Overall, Table 2 indicates that many banks, despite 
meeting the existing capital requirements, experienced difficulties because they did not prudently 
manage their liquidity.  In addition, we find that, as expected, the values of NSFR computed 
following the revised 2014 methodology are slightly higher than those of those obtained following 
                                                          
15 To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize observations in the outside 1 per cent of each tail of both target 
variables. 
the original 2010 document. This outcome confirms the findings of Gobat et al. (2014), according 
to whom the key factor contributing to the recent improvements in NSFR has been the change in the 
ASF factor for deposits. 
  
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for our variables of interest by countries. Table 3 shows 
that there are significant differences among EU member states, especially for the NSFR (see Panel 
B). Whereas active banks from most of the EU-28 member states meet (or are close to) the 
prudential requirements for structural liquidity, F&D banks show low average values over the 
period 2004-2013, particularly in Ireland, Belgium, France and Germany, followed by Austria, 
Denmark and United Kingdom. Average NSFR values are below the regulatory requirements for 
active banks in France, Ireland and Estonia. This evidence is consistent with the results reported by 
King (2013) and Gobat et al. (2014). 
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the other determinants of bank failure by bank status 
(active vs. F&D). As expected, F&D banks, during the period 2004-2013, have lower average 
values of profitability, asset quality, operational efficiency and income diversification compared to 
active banks. Only the bank size of active and F&D banks is comparable.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
Finally, Table 5 presents the correlation matrix for our main variables of interest (capital and 
liquidity ratios) and the other explanatory factors. Although many of the pairwise correlation 
coefficients are statistically significant, the correlation magnitudes are in general low. 
 
 [Insert Table 5] 
5. Main results 
5.1 The baseline model 
Table 6 shows the results of the logistic estimations for the full sample over the period 2004 - 2013. 
Following the literature and supervisory practice, we run the model on our variables of interest (the 
Basel III capital and liquidity ratios) as well as the other determinants of bank failure and distress. 
In all the regressions we include a time dummy and the euro-zone dummy variable. 
The results are reported in Table 6. Among our target variables, we find that only the NSFR is a 
significant determinant of banking sector fragility in the EU. The results confirm the hypothesised 
sign. The negative relationship indicates that an increase in NSFR would correspond to a decrease 
of F&D probability. This result confirms that the key determinant of bank failures and distress 
during the sample period was excessive maturity transformation. Our capital variables (ETA, 
TIER1RATIO and TRCR) are never significant. Indeed, banks that ran into difficulty almost always 
had low NSFR and capital requirements well above the statutory minimum. This finding on the 
structural liquidity measure is in contrast with that of Hong et al. (2014), who find that the NSFR 
has a limited effect on US bank failures. This might be partially due to the fact that US banking has 
been subject to liquidity rules for some time (DeYoung and Jang, 2015) whereas the large majority 
of European banks did not fulfil the NSFR requirements during the financial crisis period (Dietrich 
et al, 2015). Overall, considering the whole sample, our results are not supportive of the view that 
Basel III bank capital and liquidity rules play a complementary role in fostering bank stability.  
While this paper focuses on the relationship between Basel III capital and liquidity rules and bank 
failures and distress, it is important to note that F&D probability is also related to other bank 
activities. More specifically, Table 6 shows that F&D probability is inversely related to the level of 
bank diversification (DIV) and positively related to asset quality (NPL_GL) and bank size (SIZE). 
Overall, we show that asset quality, income diversification and bank size are important 
determinants of F&D banks next to structural liquidity. The only CAMELS covariates never 
significant in our model specifications are ROAA and CIR. The latter result is in line with those of 
Poghosyan and Čihák (2011), who shows that low costs do not indicate a better ability to prevent 
bank distress.  
With reference to macroeconomic factors (GDPC and INFC), Table 6 shows that both GDPC and 
INFC are significant determinants of probability of failures and distress. We find that a higher rate 
of GDP growth and a decrease in the rate of inflationary change are associated with a more stable 
macroeconomic environment and a relatively lower likelihood of bank failure and distress. This 
outcome is line with Betz et al. (2014), who find that low real GDP growth and high inflation 
increase bank vulnerability. Thus, our results provide support for the implementation of macro-
prudential regulations as a complement to the traditional micro-prudential approach. 
Additionally, we assess the impact of market concentration on the likelihood of F&D banks and 
find a negative and significant impact HHI on bank stability. In line with the “concentration-
stability” view, this suggests that more concentrated banking markets are characterised by a lower 
likelihood of F&D banks. This result is in contrast with that of Poghosyan and Čihák (2011), who 
find a positive and significant impact of EU market concentration on the probability of distress. 
However, they show that the impact of market concentration becomes insignificant when 
macroeconomic variables are also entered in the model specification. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
5.2 The EBA large banks 
We now turn our attention to the subsample of 123 large banks, which have been subjected to the 
EBA 2014 stress test exercise. In this model, the identification of F&D banks also include as 
distressed banks those financial institutions that failed the stress tests in 2013. We re-estimate our 
baseline model on our variables of interest (the Basel III capital and liquidity ratios) as well as the 
other determinants of bank failure and distress, including time dummy and the euro-zone dummy 
variable. The results are presented in Table 7. We find that, for the largest EU banks, both Basel III 
liquidity and capital standards are significant determinants of bank failure and distress. More 
specifically, Table 7 shows that large banks more susceptible to failure or distress are those with 
weak structural liquidity and insufficient capital buffers.  
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
5.3 The complementary log-log model 
Next, we assess the strength of our results with respect to the estimation methods. Following 
Männasoo and Mayes (2009), we carry out our estimations using the complementary log-log model 
(cloglog) for both the full sample and for the sample of EBA large banks. The results are shown in 
Table 8. Complementary log-log models are frequently used when the probability of an event is 
very small or very large. In fact, cloglog belongs to the discrete time functional specifications 
applied when survival occurs in continuous time, but spell lengths are observed only in intervals, as 
it is the case for bank distress recorded on annual basis in our sample.16 The findings confirm both 
the significant role of high values of NSFR in reducing bank fragility and the fact that capital ratios 
are a key determinant of bank stability only for large banks. 
 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
To test the robustness of our main results, particularly with reference to the behaviour of both target 
variables, we perform a number of further regressions. Firstly, we test the logistic regressions using 
an alternative existing structural measure of maturity transformation risk. We compute the ratio of 
net loans to deposits and short-term funding (NL_DSTF) for the full sample during the period 2004 
                                                          
16 Guo (1993) observes that time-varying covariates offer an opportunity to examine the relation between the distress 
probability and the changing conditions under which the distress happens. 
- 2013. Table 9 shows that NL_DSTF is never significant. This result indicates that the NSFR is a 
better prudential tool than NL_DSTF. The capital ratios are insignificant. 
 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
Next, we consider the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), the second regulatory innovation of Basle III 
in terms of liquidity standards. The LCR is designed to ensure that sufficient high quality liquid assets 
(HQLA) are available for one month survival in case of a stress scenario.  HQLA are defined as cash 
or assets that can be converted into cash at little or no loss of value in private markets to meet a bank 
liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2010). The LCR has two components: (a) the value of the stock of HQLA and (b) the 
total net outflows and it is expressed as: 
 
𝐿𝐶𝑅 =  
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝑄𝐿𝐴
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 30 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
≥ 100%                   (4) 
 
Neither the numerator nor the denominator can be evaluated using publicly available balance sheet 
information and an approximation requires several assumptions. Bearing in mind this caveat, we 
consider a proxy of the LCR estimated as liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding. The 
results are reported in Table 10. We find that the LCR has no predictive power when considered as 
an alternative liquidity ratio. Our results are consistent with the findings of Hong et al (2014). We 
concur with their explanation: the LCR is designed to ensure that a solvent bank survives a short 
term liquidity shock but in case of solvency problems this buffer can do little to mitigate the 
problem However, when considered in conjunction with the NSFR (as per regulatory requirements), 
the LCR becomes significative (but only when considering ETA as proxy for capital). This result 
lends support to our choice to focus on the NSFR: we argue that a good management of structural 
liquidity can lessen the negative effect of illiquidity in the short-term.  
[Insert Table 10] 
 
To avoid potential distortions driven by the inclusion of those countries that are not affected by 
F&D events, we estimate the logistic regressions considering only those countries with both active 
and F&D banks.17 The findings illustrated in Table 10 confirm the positive effect of a higher NSFR 
on bank stability and confirms the insignificant role of capital ratios. 
 
[Insert Table 11] 
 
In addition, in Table 12 we analyse whether capital and liquidity ratios are good predictors of  F&D 
two or three years prior to the event. We find that the capital ratios are never significant.18 In 
addition, we show that only new final version of the NSFR (October 2014) has predictive power 
and remains stable within three-year forward window. This finding supports the recent changes put 
forward by the BCBS and shows that the new calibration of the NSFR is an effective tool in terms 
of improving bank stability. 
 
[Insert Table 12] 
 
Finally, we consider the subprime dummy crisis (D_SubCrisis), that takes the value of 1 for the 
years 2008-2009 and 0 otherwise, and the sovereign debt dummy crisis (D_SovCrisis), equals to 1 
from 2010 onward and 0 otherwise. The latter two dummies variables allow us to take into account 
                                                          
17  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United 
Kingdom are those EU countries that in our analysis have both active and F&D banks.  
18 In Table 11 we show only the results with the capital ratio proxied by ETA. However, we obtain very similar results 
using TIER1RATIO or TRCR. 
the impact of the two crises separately. We hypothesise a positive relationship between the 
dummies crises and our dependent variable. We always find a positive and significant sign for both 
D_SubCrisis and D_SovCrisis. Table 13 shows that among the two dummies crisis, D_SovCrisis is 
the most significant. This result is in line with the fact that the EU banks were affected principally 
by the sovereign debt crisis. 
[Insert Table 13] 
  
7. Conclusions 
The global financial crisis highlighted the risks of maturity mismatches and unstable funding mix 
on banks’ balance sheets. This has lead to changes in the regulatory and supervisory frameworks 
governing bank liquidity. In addition, the combined role of structural liquidity and capital cushions 
under Basel III aims to reduce potential bank distress and promote financial stability. 
Despite the prolonged period of financial instability, unlike in the US, outright bank failures have 
been rare in Europe. To evaluate the impact of Basel III structural liquidity and capital ratios on 
bank stability, in this paper we utilise a broader definition of failure and distress to include banks 
under receivership, bankrupt, dissolved, or in liquidation. If a bank was ‘dissolved by merger’ we 
classify it as F&D banks only if the merger was driven by distress. Finally, we incorporate 
information on state aid and, for large banks, information on EBA stress tests. These criteria allow 
us to test the relationship between structural liquidity and capital ratios as introduced by Basel III on 
banks’ probability of default. The results of the analysis are of particular interest to both academics 
and policy makers as they contribute to the current debate on the effectiveness of the combined role 
of Basel III structural liquidity and capital cushions in promoting bank stability, 
Contrary to expectations, we find that capital and liquidity ratios play a complementary role in 
fostering bank stability only for the largest banks. When considering all banks our results indicate 
that only the NSFR is a significant determinant of bank failure in Europe. This result is consistent 
with the view that during the global financial crisis and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis, the key 
source of bank failures and distress was excessive maturity transformation. Our results indicate that 
those EU banks that run into difficulties almost always had low structural liquidity. On the other 
hand, troubled banks’ capital requirements were well above the statutory minimum. In addition, we 
find a stronger predictive power of the final version of the NSFR (October 2014) compared to the 
earlier (December 2010) version. These findings indicate that the recent changes on the NSFR are 
effective in terms of improving bank stability and are therefore supportive of regulatory efforts.  
When considering only EU large banks, we find that both liquidity and capital standards are 
significant in reducing bank fragility. Hence, the results provide support for the Basel III regulations 
on structural liquidity and capital, but the increased capital requirements seem to impact only the 
largest banking groups. This result is in line with the major emphasis placed by the Basel 
Committee on the global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).  
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 Table 1. Database overview 
Panel A illustrates the sample distribution, by bank status, for the full sample of banks headquartered in the 28 EU member states over the period 2004-2013. Columns I and VII 
(F&D) include banks that satisfy one of the following three conditions during 2004-2013: (1) banks that changed their status from ‘active’ to either: ‘under receivership’, 
‘bankruptcy’, ‘dissolved’, or ‘in liquidation’; (2) banks defined by BankScope as ‘dissolved by merger’ but with a coverage ratio smaller than 0 within 12 months before the 
M&A  (the coverage ratio is defined as: total equity and loan loss reserve minus non-performing loans to total assets); (3) banks that received state aids, as collected by 
Mediobanca (2013). Columns II and VIII show the number of large banks observed by the EBA in the EU-wide stress testing exercise of 2014 that failed the stress test. This 
information is taken into consideration in the definition of our dependent variable (F&D banks) only for the subsample of large banks. Columns III and VIII present the 
distribution of the total F&D observed over the period 2004-2013. Columns IV and IX show ‘active banks’ and include banks that satisfy one of these following two conditions 
during 2004-2013: (1) banks classified by BankScope database as ‘active’ entities; (2) banks defined by BankScope as ‘dissolved by merger’ but with a coverage ratio equal or 
higher than 0 within 12 months before the operation. For each EU country, Columns V and X show the sum of active and F&D banks for the full sample. Column VI presents the 
% of F&D that is computed as the ratio of F&D banks (column I) on total banks (column V).  
Panel B shows the F&D banks distribution for each EU country in each year.  
* Norway is part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and as such the country is considered by EBA in its stress test exercise. We do not include it in the full sample as not a 
EU member state. **The year 2013 includes also the EBA stress test information. 
 
Panel A: F&D and Active Banks by Country 
 N. of banks  Bank-year observation 
Country (I) 
F&D 
 
(II) 
F&D  
EBA stress test 
(III) 
Total F&D 
(including EBA 
stress test) 
(IV) 
Active 
(V) 
Total  
(I+IV) 
(VI) 
% of  
F&D 
 (VII) 
F&D 
(VIII) 
Total F&D 
(including 
EBA stress 
test) 
(IX) 
Active 
(X) 
Total  
(VII+IX) 
Austria 5 3 5 21 26 0.19  14 14 103 117 
Belgium 4 2 4 7 11 0.36  9 9 21 30 
Bulgaria 0 - 0 7 7 0  0 0 30 30 
Croatia 0 - 0 5 5 0  0 0 19 19 
Cyprus 0 3 3 5 5 0.60  0 3 23 23 
Czech Republic 0 - 0 4 4 0  0 0 27 27 
Denmark 12 0 12 13 25 0.48  35 35 56 91 
Estonia 0 - 0 2 2 0  0 0 13 13 
Finland 0 0 0 9 9 0  0 0 52 52 
France 8 1 8 46 54 0.14  20 20 160 180 
Germany 7 4 8 44 51 0.18  15 16 202 217 
Greece 10 4 10 11 21 0.47  31 31 36 67 
Hungary 0 0 0 9 9 0  0 0 43 43 
Ireland 2 3 3 3 5 0.60  7 8 10 17 
Italy 25 9 29 47 72 0.40  66 70 163 229 
Latvia 0 0 0 8 8 0  0 0 21 21 
Lithuania 0 - 0 3 3 0  0 0 6 6 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 7 7 0  0 0 36 36 
Malta 0 0 0 1 1 0  0 0 8 8 
Netherlands 2 1 2 17 19 0.10  4 4 69 73 
Norway*  0 0 1 - 0  - 0 - - 
Poland 0 0 0 13 13 0  0 0 58 58 
Portugal 3 2 4 14 17 0.23  13 14 59 72 
Romania 0 - 0 9 9 0  0 0 39 39 
Slovakia 0 - 0 4 4 0  0 0 31 31 
Slovenia 0 2 2 6 6 0.33  0 2 29 29 
Spain 22 1 22 58 80 0.27  59 59 240 299 
Sweden 0 0 0 12 12 0  0 0 47 47 
United Kingdom 6 0 6 22 28 0.21  19 19 89 108 
Total 106 35 118 407 513 0.23  292 304 1,690 1,982 
 
Panel B: F&D Banks by Country and Year (bank-year observation) 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013** 
Austria 1     3 2 2 2 4 
Belgium  1   3 1  1 1 2 
Bulgaria           
Croatia           
Cyprus          3 
Czech Republic           
Denmark      2 10 9 8 6 
Estonia           
Finland           
France 1 2  1 2 2 3 3 3 3 
Germany 1 1 1   2 2 2 3 4 
Greece     1 4 7 6 7 6 
Hungary           
Ireland     1 1 1 1 2 2 
Italy    1  3 2 12 26 26 
Latvia           
Lithuania           
Luxembourg           
Malta           
Netherlands       1 1  2 
Poland           
Portugal    1 2 2 2 2 3 2 
Romania           
Slovakia           
Slovenia          2 
Spain    1 7 8 9 11 12 11 
Sweden           
United Kingdom      2 4 4 4 5 
Total 3 4 1 4 16 30 43 54 71 78 
 
Table 2. Target variables by bank status and year 
 
This table reports summary statistics on our target variables (Basel III capital and liquidity ratios) by bank status (active banks versus failed and distressed banks, F&D) and year. 
Panel A shows the capital buffers (ETA, TIER1RATIO or TRCR) and Panel B shows the structural liquidity ratios (NSFR2014 or NSFR2010) used in our analysis. The target 
variables are defined in Section 4.4. All variables are winsorised at the 1 per cent of each tail. Our sample of banks covers the 28 EU member states over the period 2004-2013 
and includes the 123 large banks subjected to the EBA stress test 2014 exercise. 
The columns labelled (F&D) include banks that satisfy one of the following three conditions during 2004-2013: (1) banks that changed their status from ‘active’ to either: ‘under 
receivership’, ‘bankruptcy’, ‘dissolved’, or ‘in liquidation’; (2) banks defined by BankScope as ‘dissolved by merger’ but with a coverage ratio smaller than 0 within 12 months 
before the M&A  (the coverage ratio is defined as: total equity and loan loss reserve minus non-performing loans to total assets); (3) banks that received state aids, as collected by 
Mediobanca (2013). The columns labelled ‘active banks’ include banks that satisfy one of these following two conditions during 2004-2013: (1) banks classified by BankScope 
database as ‘active’ entities; (2) banks defined by BankScope as ‘dissolved by merger’ but with a coverage ratio equal or higher than 0 within 12 months before the operation. 
 
 
Panel A: Capital ratios by bank status and year 
 
 
Year 
ETA TIER1RATIO TRCR 
F&D banks Active banks F&D banks Active banks F&D banks Active banks 
Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. 
2004 6.441 
(4.125) 
1.568-15.469 8.807 
(6.085) 
2.352-40.489 11.879 
(7.589) 
6.589-40.259 11.988 
(7.624) 
6.450-41.205 13.549 
(7.469) 
9.168-27.659 14.334 
(8.680) 
7.56-48.98 
2005 5.559 
(3.569) 
1.258-15.896 7.611 
(5.116) 
2.042-40.545 10.549 
(6.012) 
5.493-38.745 10.718 
(6.264) 
6.39-39.8 12.449 
(6.231) 
8.556-25.778 13.573 
(4.279) 
8.92-33.6 
2006 5.489 
(3.874) 
1.225-14.662 7.417 
(4.519) 
1.625-35.624 8.456 
(2.459) 
6.425-16.785 9.456 
(2.879) 
5.790-23.498 11.106 
(5.123) 
8.412-23.789 13.360 
(5.711) 
7.56-46.21 
2007 5.351 
(3.578) 
1.546-15.351 7.377 
(5.164) 
1.518-57.12 6.7 
(1.298) 
3.789-13.489 9.034 
(2.787) 
5.45-22.6 10.1 
(1.223) 
8.756-15.648 11.927 
(2.529) 
7.56-22.6 
2008 4.653 
(1.600) 
1.238-7.871 6.507 
(3.189) 
1.238-24.511 8.374 
(2.213) 
6.6-14.65 8.825 
(2.242) 
4.9-20 11.236 
(1.659) 
9.9-16.16 11.566 
(2.111) 
7.56-19.3 
2009 6.422 
(2.675) 
2.365-16.199 7.482 
(4.130) 
1.238-36.614 10.443 
(3.845) 
6.62-26.6 10.643 
(3.539) 
4.9-34.49 13.092 
(3.107) 
9.25-26.2 13.412 
(3.557) 
7.56-37.95 
2010 6.501 
(3.384) 
2.079-15.018 8.071 
(4.902) 
1.238-35.969 11.596 
(4.146) 
4.9-28.3 12.116 
(4.964) 
4.9-41 13.652 
(3.511) 
7.56-28 14.633 
(5.315) 
7.56-48.98 
2011 5.886 
(3.295) 
1.238-16.117 7.863 
(4.554) 
1.915-31.288 10.554 
(3.724) 
4.9-25.5 12.346 
(4.945) 
4.9-41 13.026 
(3.437) 
7.56-27.6 14.554 
(5.153) 
7.56-48.98 
2012 6.014 
(3.267) 
1.238-14.551 7.896 
(4.371) 
1.238-26.678 10.915 
(4.366) 
4.9-33.5 12.822 
(4.543) 
4.9-34.67 13.527 
(3.888) 
7.56-31.9 15.186 
(4.699) 
7.56-34.7 
2013 6.644 
(2.708) 
1.238-14.313 8.627 
(4.317) 
1.238-26.264 12.069 
(4.122) 
5.63-33.9 13.646 
(4.398) 
4.9-32.5 14.697 
(4.075) 
8.17-31.3 15.834 
(4.369) 
7.56-32.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Liquidity ratios by bank status and year 
 
 
Year 
NSFR2014 NSFR2010 
F&D banks Active banks F&D banks Active banks 
Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. 
2004 92.962 
(44.160) 
22.797-149.183 97.809 
(37.899) 
25.833-211.276 84.256 
(22.758) 
35.448-148.599 104.279 
(63.543) 
29.111-418.534 
2005 96.789 
(35.668) 
40.536-174.067 100.869 
(31.253) 
29.856-228.357 90.336 
(31.190) 
31.141-153.950 98.535 
(34.921) 
33.569-259.839 
2006 92.567 
(66.752) 
22.525-150.235 97.956 
(22.866) 
43.648-165.279 94.961 
(35.465) 
16.589-168.659 94.788 
(29.404) 
35.856-242.994 
2007 90.785 
(15.658) 
36.458-121.478 99.624 
(22.864) 
35.638-183.112 80.172 
(23.459) 
26.789-101.589 93.535 
(24.238) 
35.154-162.823 
2008 86.705 
(24.566) 
29.002-109.513 97.866 
(27.284) 
25.372-229.909 80.729 
(23.853) 
27.809-102.655 89.854 
(26.596) 
18.492-195.794 
2009 95.364 
(19.235) 
59.087-159.821 99.246 
(28.801) 
18.710-214.195 85.938 
(21.153) 
43.979-154.651 91.383 
(31.263) 
15.816-283.794 
2010 96.631 
(20.863) 
58.935-162.611 101.215 
(28.079) 
18.503-212.777 87.009 
(23.644) 
46.385-150.581 92.036 
(29.806) 
12.868-274.233 
2011 87.934 
(13.768) 
47.226-121.090 104.010 
(29.779) 
17.686-238.313 79.395 
(15.026) 
43.918-116.598 94.867 
(30.487) 
13.302-227.959 
2012 87.184 
(16.406) 
36.680-136.708 102.976 
(30.643) 
18.619-247.268 78.094 
(14.151) 
38.788-111.402 94.289 
(32.497) 
10.411-255.264 
2013 90.520 
(16.995) 
37.050-122.924 106.069 
(31.026) 
33.092-272.192 80.824 
(15.876) 
38.415-131.563 98.500 
(38.773) 
23.286-350.433 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Target variables by bank status and country 
 
This table reports summary statistics on our target variables (capital and liquidity ratios of Basel III) by bank status (active banks versus failed and distressed banks, F&D) and 
country. Panel A shows the capital buffers (ETA, TIER1RATIO or TRCR) and Panel B shows the structural liquidity ratios (NSFR2014 or NSFR2010) used in our analysis. The 
target variables are defined in Section 4.4. All variables are winsorised at the 1 per cent of each tail. Our sample of banks covers the 28 EU member states over the period 2004-
2013 and includes the 123 large banks subjected to the EBA stress test 2014 exercise. 
The columns labelled (F&D) include banks that satisfy one of the following three conditions during 2004-2013: (1) banks that changed their status from ‘active’ to either: ‘under 
receivership’, ‘bankruptcy’, ‘dissolved’, or ‘in liquidation’; (2) banks defined by BankScope as ‘dissolved by merger’ but with a coverage ratio smaller than 0 within 12 months 
before the M&A  (the coverage ratio is defined as: total equity and loan loss reserve minus non-performing loans to total assets); (3) banks that received state aids, as collected by 
Mediobanca (2013). The columns labelled ‘active banks’ include banks that satisfy one of these following two conditions during 2004-2013: (1) banks classified by BankScope 
database as ‘active’ entities; (2) banks defined by BankScope as ‘dissolved by merger’ but with a coverage ratio equal or higher than 0 within 12 months before the operation. 
 
 
Panel A: Capital ratios by bank status and country 
 
 
Country 
ETA TIER1RATIO TRCR 
F&D banks Active banks F&D banks Active banks F&D banks Active banks 
Mean 
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean 
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean 
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean 
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean 
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean 
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. 
Austria 6.559 
(1.537) 
3.107-8.339 8.690 
(5.393) 
3.189-40.489 9.782 
(2.145) 
6.07-15.3 11.760 
(6.549) 
6.6-41 13.338 
(2.103) 
10.27-18.7 15.734 
(7.419) 
9.3-48.98 
Belgium 4.586 
(2.476) 
2.199-11.905 5.951 
(2.741) 
1.238-10.806 12.652 
(2.187) 
10.6-15.8 14.299 
(2.655) 
9.5-16.9 15.288 
(2.617) 
11.8-19 17.750 
(3.426) 
10.1-21.6 
Bulgaria   13.936 
(2.731) 
7.988-18.078   14.124 
(3.208) 
8.1-18.23   16.440 
(3.247) 
12.49-23.88 
Croatia   12.525 
(3.616) 
4.553-18.215   18.938 
(4.581) 
11.91-24.75   19.052 
(3.931) 
12.77-24.16 
Cyprus   8.702 
(3.032) 
1.238-14.137   9.585 
(2.124) 
4.9-13.1   12.588 
(3.611) 
7.56-20 
Czech Republic   8.874 
(1.614) 
6.181-12.778   12.669 
(1.941) 
8.32-15.6   15.311 
(2.755) 
10.7-21.3 
Denmark 6.906 
(3.218) 
2.926-17.799 10.262 
(3.282) 
4.209-16.199 16.501 
(6.208) 
7.5-33.9 13.374 
(4.393) 
6.5-27.8 17.535 
(5.185) 
13.14-31.9 15.264 
(3.284) 
8.6-21.3 
Estonia   10.047 
(5.781) 
4.302-21.182   17.386 
(9.764) 
8.6-32.5   18.705 
(7.334) 
10.92-32.5 
Finland   6.328 
(1.955) 
2.748-10.262   12.032 
(2.337) 
7.5-18   14.649 
(2.160) 
10.6-20.2 
France 4.412 
(0.589) 
2.841-5.178 7.312 
(4.953) 
1.238-24.195 11.211 
(1.663) 
7.8-13.6 10.926 
(2.618) 
6.62-22.89 13.270 
(1.612) 
11.1-16.3 12.058 
(2.714) 
7.56-22.89 
Germany 3.728 
(1.205) 
2.526-6.474 5.192 
(2.679) 
1.238-22.087 12.918 
(1.919) 
9.6-16.9 10.768 
(3.557) 
4.9-21.3 16.045 
(1.934) 
13.8-19.2 13.939 
(4.397) 
7.56-30.3 
Greece 5.643 
(3.297) 
1.238-13.433 10.480 
(12.151) 
2.807-57.120 10.394 
(3.665) 
4.9-18.5 10.758 
(7.978) 
4.9-39.8 11.346 
(3.107) 
7.56-19 10.740 
(1.587) 
7.56-13.5 
Hungary   8.744 
(3.174) 
2.856-18.645   9.753 
(3.806) 
4.9-17.37   13.444 
(3.498) 
7.56-19.9 
Ireland 4.291 2.135-6.242 7.201 2.995-10.584 12.128 4.9-18 10.598 6.6-17.9 15.042 9.2-20.5 12.047 9.2-17.9 
(1.432) (2.572) (5.489) (3.674) (4.963) (3.089) 
Italy 6.691 
(1.590) 
2.949-9.539 8.655 
(3.870) 
2.011-34.172 8.790 
(1.723) 
5.62-13.23 9.522 
(4.651) 
5.11-34.1 12.055 
(2.214) 
8-18.91 12.347 
(4.215) 
7.56-34.1 
Latvia   9.850 
(2.762) 
4.872-16.872   - -   15.159 
(2.296) 
11.12-17.8 
Lithuania   7.527 
(1.760) 
5.644-10.687   5.530 
(0) 
5.530-5.530   10.553 
(2.005) 
8.64-12.64 
Luxembourg   6.560 
(3.037) 
2.150-16.951   11.681 
(4.364) 
4.9-22.38   16.334 
(6.186) 
7.56-26.37 
Malta   6.997 
(0.504) 
6.313-7.950   10.812 
(0.943) 
9.9-11.86   14.381 
(2.079) 
11.5-16.51 
Netherlands 3.637 
(0.900) 
2.822-4.890 10.246 
(7.753) 
1.639-36.614 14.15 
(1.626) 
13-15.3 12.786 
(4.695) 
7.4-33.6 18.5 
(2.404) 
16.8-20.2 15.141 
(4.551) 
10.5-33.6 
Poland   10.341 
(3.506) 
3.429-17.306   12.221 
(3.561) 
5.62-18.8   13.676 
(2.562) 
8.81-18.83 
Portugal 6.509 
(1.568) 
4.427-9.240 7.392 
(3.250) 
1.915-17.968 9.841 
(2.752) 
6.6-16.2 9.778 
(2.065) 
5.45-14.2 12.145 
(1.736) 
10.1-16.2 11.768 
(1.567) 
8.95-15.2 
Romania   11.102 
(3.007) 
7.034-20.047   13.863 
(3.110) 
9.76-20.99   15.444 
(3.401) 
10.9-24.38 
Slovakia   9.372 
(1.721) 
6.281-12.775   12.268 
(1.897) 
9.4-16.01   13.077 
(3.304) 
9.05-24.12 
Slovenia   7.623 
(1.909) 
1..238-
11.640 
  9.018 
(3.116) 
4.9-18.06   10.929 
(2.282) 
7.56-18.06 
Spain 4.136 
(2.044) 
1.238-10.233 6.898 
(3.913) 
1.238-26.809 9.792 
(2.814) 
4.9-15.2 9.543 
(2.656) 
4.9-22.4 12.096 
(2.208) 
7.56-16.2 12.286 
(2.623) 
7.56-27.1 
Sweden   5.935 
(4.333) 
3.272-21.656   13.429 
(8.563) 
6.19-35.23   15.803 
(8.998) 
8.87-41.71 
United Kingdom 5.914 
(4.121) 
3.230-15.647 5.483 
(2.718) 
1.625-17.065 12.073 
(2.450) 
7.9-15.89 11.465 
(3.135) 
6.53-20.8 16.405 
(3.187) 
12-25.3 15.899 
(3.046) 
10.5-26.1 
 
Panel B: Liquidity ratios by bank status and country 
 
 
Country 
NSFR2014 NSFR2010 
F&D banks Active banks F&D banks Active banks 
Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. Mean  
(dev. std.) 
Min. –Max. 
Austria 86.183 
(18.592) 
58.919-115.263 91.406 
(32.571) 
18.619-228.357 79.840 
(18.197) 
48.571-97.905 87.722 
(29.014) 
10.411-168.922 
Belgium 77.321 
(27.141) 
29.002-92.645 125.915 
(31.715) 
68.798-160.196 66.452 
(21.634) 
27.809-78.091 111.599 
(30.710) 
59.767-160.053 
Bulgaria   108.705 
(17.050) 
72.618-141.539   105.427 
(14.805) 
71.925-135.959 
Croatia   114.128 
(20.952) 
75.840-141.041   116.155 
(25.064) 
69.372-161.143 
Cyprus   112.288 
(21.472) 
79.145-167.551   122.609 
(69.916) 
77.217-354.816 
Czech Republic   117.308 
(27.540) 
43.648-145.859   102.730 
(22.772) 
41.061-133.919 
Denmark 86.819 
(22.197) 
48.533-150.165 98.227 
(20.353) 
61.258-142.234 75.116 
(25.539) 
33.951-151.370 81.185 
(23.027) 
38.415-140.643 
Estonia   81.007 
(31.663) 
31.670-137.343   94.134 
(54.656) 
31.796-214.644 
Finland   92.871 
(26.634) 
45.508-195.293   80.674 
(26.603) 
34.115-166.909 
France 78.760 
(11.363) 
55.061-92.748 84.611 
(34.137) 
28.743-202.607 61.299 
(11.092) 
39.624-76.173 80.416 
(45.233) 
18.492-283.794 
Germany 79.615 
(9.059) 
59.087-90.565 111.774 
(39.533) 
18.503-272.192 60.545 
(6.593) 
43.979-68.154 97.041 
(33.855) 
17.877-238.860 
Greece 91.477 
(24.619) 
47.226-162.611 99.363 
(21.157) 
50.855-139.307 87.632 
(23.131) 
45.168-154.651 98.128 
(19.993) 
48.015-131.130 
Hungary   88.919 
(16.193) 
39.462-130.401   84.186 
(17.591) 
38.045-124.399 
Ireland 60.861 
(25.318) 
17.686-101.085 81.609 
(14.709) 
60.661-101.560 55.536 
(24.600) 
13.735-93.929 73.931 
(12.600) 
53.416-89.649 
Italy 90.350 
(12.726) 
42.266-110.579 98.371 
(15.791) 
44.884-149.261 83.552 
(9.480) 
62.011-103.578 91.719 
(14.926) 
38.496-145.425 
Latvia   143.460 
(37.961) 
63.798-191.991   164.014 
(95.239) 
58.967-418.534 
Lithuania   94.152 
(8.416) 
85.484-102.292   86.672 
(11.748) 
65.380-96.306 
Luxembourg   107.806 
(18.182) 
53.969-132.283   100.417 
(27.748) 
53.214-166.784 
Malta   127.792 
(7.604) 
117.957-139.515   105.487 
(11.915) 
95.401-124.950 
Netherlands 96.842 
(23.786) 
70.498-116.743 103.306 
(35.140) 
25.833-189.942 86.001 
(22.265) 
61.529-105.061 99.990 
(43.164) 
26.701-272.130 
Poland   120.528 
(19.941) 
39.091-151.903   111.466 
(19.565) 
36.517-144.716 
Portugal 97.212 
(11.199) 
79.829-122.924 100.169 
(15.862) 
58.799-130.118 89.258 
(11.717) 
73.573-116.709 93.964 
(16.809) 
57.995-132.916 
Romania   125.011 
(24.391) 
35.293-166.584   121.604 
(25.223) 
33.116-161.729 
Slovakia   135.106 
(17.028) 
106.271-170.149   127.298 
(20.853) 
89.307-178.290 
Slovenia   95.679 
(22.396) 
39.181-130.099   85.958 
(20.651) 
37.116-123.619 
Spain 94.254 
(18.865) 
36.680-136.708 99.968 
(12.987) 
46.746-138.068 88.376 
(15.627) 
53.555-141.909 94.829 
(17.804) 
55.787-242.994 
Sweden   97.451 
(19.559) 
36.763-128.628   90.116 
(25.248) 
31.452-169.759 
United Kingdom 86.239 
(14.028) 
55.474-106.729 92.727 
(20.014) 
58.680-147.955 76.688 
(18.111) 
53.556-131.563 80.937 
(24.504) 
49.208-161.939 
Table 4. Summary statistics of the other determinants of bank F&D by bank status 
 
This table reports summary statistics on the other determinants of bank F&D for the full sample and for the active and 
F&D banks. These variables are defined in Section 4.5. All variables are winsorised at the 1 per cent of each tail. Our 
sample of banks covers the 28 EU member states over the period 2004-2013 and includes the 123 large banks subjected 
to the EBA stress test 2014 exercise. 
The columns labelled (F&D) include banks that satisfy one of the following three conditions during 2004-2013: (1) 
banks that changed their status from ‘active’ to either: ‘under receivership’, ‘bankruptcy’, ‘dissolved’, or ‘in 
liquidation’; (2) banks defined by BankScope as ‘dissolved by merger’ but with a coverage ratio smaller than 0 within 
12 months before the M&A  (the coverage ratio is defined as: total equity and loan loss reserve minus non-performing 
loans to total assets); (3) banks that received state aids, as collected by Mediobanca (2013). The columns labelled 
‘active banks’ include banks that satisfy one of these following two conditions during 2004-2013: (1) banks classified 
by BankScope database as ‘active’ entities; (2) banks defined by BankScope as ‘dissolved by merger’ but with a 
coverage ratio equal or higher than 0 within 12 months before the operation. 
 
 
 
Variables 
F&D banks Active banks Full sample 
Mean 
(dev. Std.) 
Min. - Max. Mean 
(dev. Std.) 
Min. - Max. Mean 
(dev. Std.) 
Min. - Max. 
ROAA -0.448 
(1.763) 
-7.348-4.429 0.467 
(1.422) 
-7.348-10.630 0.019 
(1.523) 
-7.348-10.630 
CIR 67.987 
(24.150) 
23.614-188.963 64.848 
(21.229) 
16.641-188.963 66.417 
(23.498) 
16.614-188.963 
NPL_GL 5.354 
(3.870) 
0-18.860 2.952 
(3.361) 
0-18.860 4.153 
(3.129) 
0-18.860 
DIV 32.743 
(16.641) 
-50.098-81.045 39.637 
(22.461) 
-50.098-103.639 36.190 
(18.798) 
-50.098-
103.639 
SIZE 10.830 
(1.941) 
5.682-14.050 9.728 
(1.928) 
3.826-14.050 10.279 
(1.930) 
3.826-14.050 
GDPC     0.034 
(2.505) 
-17.669-10.988 
INFC     2.303 
(1.263) 
-1.706-11.950 
HHI     0.147 
(0.061) 
0.058-0.682 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Correlations 
 
This table shows the correlation matrix for the explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis over the sample period. See Sections 4.4 and 4.5 for the description of the 
explanatory variables. * indicates statistically significance at the 5 per cent level. 
 
 ETA TIER1RATIO TRCR NSFR2014 NSFR2010 ROAA CIR NPL_GL DIV SIZE GDPC INFC HHI LCR 
ETA 1.0000              
TIER1RATIO 0.5416* 1.0000             
TRCR 0.5330* 0.9200* 1.0000            
NSFR2014 0.1424* 0.1241* 0.0692* 1.0000           
NSFR2010 0.0372* 0.1194* 0.1002* 0.8215* 1.0000          
ROAA 0.3739* 0.1094* 0.0844* 0.1857* 0.0623* 1.0000         
CIR -0.0034 -0.0047 0.0458* -0.0280 0.0864* -0.3862* 1.0000        
NPL_GL 0.0788 0.0076 0.0304 -0.1039* -0.0684* -0.2487* 0.0592* 1.0000       
DIV 0.2583 0.0657* 0.0575* -0.0230 -0.0227 0.2300* 0.1008* -0.0421* 1.0000      
SIZE -0.4095* -0.3109* -0.2837* -0.2588* -0.1616* -0.1389* -0.1774* -0.0246 -0.1082* 1.0000     
GDPC 0.0300* -0.0122 0.0055 0.1240* 0.0520* 0.2227* -0.0628* -0.1478* 0.0213 -0.0949* 1.0000    
INFC 0.0312* -0.0058 -0.0042 0.0950* 0.0697* 0.0617* 0.0153 0.0236 -0.0412* -0.1482* 0.2496* 1.0000   
HHI 0.0656* 0.0629* 0.0945* 0.0577* 0.0550* 0.0307* 0.0135 0.0727* -0.0348* -0.1873* 0.0810* 0.0941* 1.0000  
LCR 0.2810* 0.1712* 0.2056* -0.1816* 0.0431* 0.1763* 0.0833* -0.0654* 0.2947* -0.0160 0.0568* -0.0111 0.0193 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Logistic estimations results (full sample) 
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of pooled logistic regressions on the full sample (EU 28 member states) 
over the period 2004-2013. The dependent variable is the failed and distress bank dummy variable (F&D) that takes 
value of 1 when a bank i failed or experiences financial distress in time period t and 0 otherwise banks. Capital (ETA, 
TIER1RATIO or TRCR) and liquidity ratios (NSFR2014 or NSFR2010) are our target variables. As explanatory 
variables we also include the other CAMELS covariates (ROAA, CIR, NPL_GL, and DIV), the control variables (SIZE, 
GDPC, INFC and HHI), and the euro zone dummy variable (D_EuroZone). All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year, except D_EuroZone. The dependent variable and independent variables are defined in Section 4. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Year dummy variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
Variables ETA and  
NSFR2014 
TIER1RATIO 
and NSFR2014 
TRCR and 
NSFR2014 
ETA and 
NSFR2010 
TIER1RATIO 
and NSFR2010 
TRCR and 
NSFR2010 
CAPITAL (-1) -0.025 
(0.035) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
-0.029 
(0.023) 
-0.024 
(0.035) 
-0.029 
(0.027) 
-0.030 
(0.023) 
LIQUIDITY (-1) -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.035) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
ROAA (-1) -0.054 
(0.087) 
-0.036 
(0.092) 
-0.017 
(0.085) 
-0.051 
(0.088) 
-0.036 
(0.093) 
-0.011 
(0.086) 
CIR (-1) 0.0009 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
0.0006 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
NPL_GL (-1) 0.045 
(0.029) 
0.054* 
(0.029) 
0.045* 
(0.027) 
0.047 
(0.029) 
0.056** 
(0.029) 
0.047* 
(0.027) 
DIV (-1) -0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
SIZE (-1) 0.216*** 
(0.047) 
0.158*** 
(0.044) 
0.190*** 
(0.044) 
0.209*** 
(0.047) 
0.153*** 
(0.045) 
0.180*** 
(0.045) 
GDPC (-1) -0.229*** 
(0.039) 
-0.265*** 
(0.044) 
-0.237*** 
(0.042) 
-0.234*** 
(0.039) 
-0.268*** 
(0.044) 
-0.245*** 
(0.042) 
INFC (-1) 0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.025** 
(0.012) 
0.032** 
(0.016) 
0.0008* 
(0.0004) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.028* 
(0.014) 
HHI (-1) -1.576* 
(0.876) 
-3.187*** 
(0.971) 
-2.904*** 
(0.943) 
-1.650* 
(0.879) 
-3.279*** 
(0.974) 
-3.044*** 
(0.946) 
D_EuroZone 0.372** 
(0.195) 
0.321 
(0.207) 
0.347* 
(0.203) 
0.391** 
(0.194) 
0.339 
(0.207) 
0.364* 
(0.203) 
D_years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of obs. 1,982 1,316 1,387 1,982 1,316 1,387 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2037 0.1841 0.1849 0.2041 0.1842 0.1857 
 
Table 7. Logistic estimations results (EBA large banks) 
This table presents the results of the estimation of pooled logistic regressions on the 123 EU banks observed by EBA in 
the EU-wide stress testing 2014. The sample period is 2004-2013. The dependent variable is the failed and distress bank 
dummy variable (F&D) that takes value of 1 when a bank i failed, experiences financial distress or fails the EBA stress 
tests in time period t and 0 otherwise banks. Capital (ETA, TIER1RATIO or TRCR) and liquidity ratios (NSFR2014 or 
NSFR2010) are our target variables. As explanatory variables we also include the other CAMELS covariates (ROAA, 
CIR, NPL_GL, and DIV), the control variables (SIZE, GDPC, INFC and HHI), and the euro zone dummy variable 
(D_EuroZone). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year, except D_EuroZone. The dependent variable and 
independent variables are defined in Section 4. All variables are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Year dummy 
variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, 
and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed 
tests. 
 
Variables ETA and 
NSFR2014 
TIER1RATIO and 
NSFR2014 
TRCR and 
NSFR2014 
ETA and 
NSFR2010 
TIER1RATIO and 
NSFR2010 
TRCR and 
NSFR2010 
CAPITAL (-1) -0.232*** -0.162*** -0.076* -0.237*** -0.164*** -0.080* 
(0.066) (0.061) (0.035) (0.066) (0.063) (0.040) 
LIQUIDITY (-1) -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
ROAA (-1) 0.108 -0.004 -0.028 0.119 -0.001 -0.023 
(0.202) (0.200) (0.180) (0.207) (0.208) (0.187) 
CIR (-1) 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.010 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
NPL_GL (-1) 0.149*** 0.141** 0.126** 0.149*** 0.144** 0.127** 
(0.055) (0.057) (0.050) (0.055) (0.057) (0.050) 
DIV (-1) 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
SIZE (-1) 0.020 0.073 0.080 -0.002 0.056 0.064 
(0.112) (0.128) (0.122) (0.113) (0.130) (0.123) 
GDPC (-1) -0.165* -0.092 -0.125 -0.178** -0.106 -0.140* 
(0.087) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.084) 
INFC (-1) 0.518** 0.433** 0.425** 0.517** 0.432** 0.429** 
(0.210) (0.200) (0.196) (0.212) (0.202) (0.200) 
HHI (-1) -9.095*** -12.100*** -12.238*** -9.653*** -12.341*** -12.420*** 
(2.582) (3.588) (3.295) (2.653) (3.583) (3.275) 
D_EuroZone 3.338*** 3.159*** 3.236*** 3.430*** 3.232*** 3.315*** 
(0.580) (0.595) (0.579) (0.606) (0.613) (0.601) 
D_years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of obs. 459 435 441 459 435 441 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3414 0.3454 0.3321 0.3454 0.3473 0.3342 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8. Complementary logistic estimations results 
 
This table presents the results of the estimations of complementary logistic regressions over the period 2004-2013. The 
results for the full sample are reported in Panel A; the results for the subsample of EBA large banks are reported in 
Panel B. For the full sample the dependent variable is the failed and distress bank dummy variable (F&D) that takes 
value of 1 when a bank i failed or experiences financial distressed in time period t and 0 otherwise banks. For the 
subsample the dependent variable is the failed and distress bank dummy variable (F&D) that takes value of 1 when a 
bank i failed, experiences financial distress or fails the EBA stress tests in time period t and 0 otherwise banks. Capital 
(ETA, TIER1RATIO or TRCR) and liquidity ratios (NSFR2014 or NSFR2010) are our target variables. As explanatory 
variables we also include the other CAMELS covariates (ROAA, CIR, NPL_GL, and DIV), the control variables (SIZE, 
GDPC, INFC and HHI), and the euro zone dummy variable (D_EuroZone). All explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year, except the dummies variables. The dependent variables and independent variables are defined in Section 4. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Year dummy variables are also included in the model. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel A: Full sample 
Variables 
ETA and 
NSFR2014 
TIER1RATIO and 
NSFR2014 
TRCR and 
NSFR2014 
ETA and 
NSFR2010 
TIER1RATIO and 
NSFR2010 
TRCR and 
NSFR2010 
              CAPITAL (-1) -0.036 -0.037 -0.032 -0.036 -0.037 -0.033 
 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.020) (0.030) (0.025) (0.020) 
LIQUIDITY (-1) -0.004** -0.004* -0.005** -0.004** -0.004* -0.005** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ROAA (-1) 0.015 0.041 0.038 0.018 0.042 0.044 
 
(0.062) (0.057) (0.054) (0.063) (0.057) (0.055) 
CIR (-1) 0.002 0.004 0.004* 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
NPL_GL (-1) 0.031 0.030 0.029 0.032 0.032 0.030 
 
(0.025) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.021) 
DIV (-1) -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
SIZE (-1) 0.190*** 0.144*** 0.173*** 0.186*** 0.141*** 0.167*** 
 
(0.041) (0.038) (0.037) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) 
GDPC (-1) -0.181*** -0.211*** -0.186*** -0.185*** -0.214*** -0.191*** 
 
(0.029) (0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.032) 
INFC (-1) 0.021** 0.016** 0.016** 0.023** 0.015* 0.015** 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) 
HHI (-1) -1.398** -2.614*** -2.343*** -1.438** -2.666*** -2.422*** 
 
(0.684) (0.767) (0.753) (0.686) (0.770) (0.757) 
D_EuroZone 0.354** 0.274 0.311* 0.366** 0.285 0.321* 
 
(0.174) (0.178) (0.177) (0.173) (0.177) (0.177) 
D_years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       N. of obs. 1,982 1,316 1,387 1,982 1,316 1,387 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel B: EBA large banks 
Variables 
ETA and 
NSFR2014 
T1R and 
NSFR2014 
TRCR and 
NSFR2014 
ETA and 
NSFR2010 
T1R and 
NSFR2010 
TRCR and 
NSFR2010 
CAPITAL (-1) -0.153*** -0.106** -0.037* -0.159*** -0.108** -0.039* 
 
(0.041) (0.047) (0.019) (0.042) (0.048) (0.019) 
LIQUIDITY (-1) -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
ROAA (-1) 0.119 0.077 0.040 0.133 0.091 0.053 
 
(0.090) (0.088) (0.085) (0.091) (0.089) (0.086) 
CIR (-1) 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
NPL_GL (-1) 0.108*** 0.100** 0.096** 0.107*** 0.101** 0.096** 
 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) 
DIV (-1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
SIZE (-1) 0.055 0.085 0.081 0.032 0.067 0.060 
 
(0.075) (0.081) (0.078) (0.076) (0.083) (0.080) 
GDPC (-1) -0.114** -0.097* -0.111* -0.122** -0.107* -0.121** 
 
(0.053) (0.058) (0.058) (0.053) (0.058) (0.057) 
INFC (-1) 0.351** 0.275** 0.277** 0.354** 0.275** 0.281** 
 
(0.138) (0.133) (0.134) (0.139) (0.135) (0.137) 
HHI (-1) -5.653*** -6.991*** -7.419*** -5.923*** -7.138*** -7.568*** 
 
(1.827) (2.312) (2.214) (1.853) (2.313) (2.222) 
D_EuroZone 2.520*** 2.370*** 2.490*** 2.591*** 2.430*** 2.563*** 
 
(0.486) (0.517) (0.509) (0.501) (0.531) (0.524) 
D_year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       N. of obs. 459 435 441 459 435 441 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 9. Logistic estimations results with an alternative liquidity measure 
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of pooled logistic regressions on the full sample over the period 2004-
2013 using an alternative measure of bank liquidity: net loans to deposits and short-term funding (NL_DSTF). The 
dependent variable is the failed and distress bank dummy variable (F&D) that takes value of 1 when a bank i failed or 
experiences financial distressed in time period t and 0 otherwise banks. Capital (ETA, TIER1RATIO or TRCR) and 
liquidity ratios (NL_DSTF) are our target variables. As explanatory variables we also include the other CAMELS 
covariates (ROAA, CIR, NPL_GL, and DIV), the control variables (SIZE, GDPC, INFC and HHI), and the Euro Zone 
dummy variable (D_EuroZone). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year, except D_EuroZone. The dependent 
variable and independent variables are defined in Section 4. All variables are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Year 
dummy variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts 
***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-
tailed tests. 
 
Variables ETA TIER1RATIO TRCR 
CAPITAL (-1) -0.024 
(0.036) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.028 
(0.024) 
NL_DSTF (-1) 0.0007 
(0.001) 
-0.0008 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
ROAA (-1) -0.069 
(0.089) 
-0.049 
(0.094) 
-0.036 
(0.086) 
CIR (-1) 0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.003) 
NPL_GL (-1) 0.057** 
(0.029) 
0.063** 
(0.030) 
0.055** 
(0.027) 
DIV (-1) -0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009** 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
SIZE (-1) 0.241*** 
(0.046) 
0.179*** 
(0.043) 
0.216*** 
(0.042) 
GDPC (-1) -0.226*** 
(0.038) 
-0.269*** 
(0.044) 
-0.238*** 
(0.043) 
INFC (-1) -0.004 
(0.064) 
-0.040 
(0.080) 
-0.045 
(0.076) 
HHI (-1) -1.632* 
(0.884) 
-3.282*** 
(0.209) 
-2.963*** 
(0.960) 
D_EuroZone 0.401* 
(0.199) 
0.342 
(0.209) 
0.368* 
(0.206) 
D_years Yes Yes Yes 
N. of obs. 1,977 1,314 1,384 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2006 0.1819 0.1818 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Logistic estimations results with a proxy for Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of pooled logistic regressions on the full sample over the period 2004-
2013 using liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding as a proxy for Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). The 
dependent variable is the failed and distress bank dummy variable (F&D) that takes value of 1 when a bank i failed or 
experiences financial distressed in time period t and 0 otherwise banks. Capital (ETA, TIER1RATIO or TRCR) and 
liquidity ratios (LCR and NSFR2014) are our target variables. As explanatory variables we also include the other 
CAMELS covariates (ROAA, CIR, NPL_GL, and DIV), the control variables (SIZE, GDPC, INFC and HHI), and the 
Euro Zone dummy variable (D_EuroZone). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year, except D_EuroZone. The 
dependent variable and independent variables are defined in Section 4. All variables are winsorized at the 1% of each 
tail. Year dummy variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The 
superscripts ***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Variables ETA TIER1RATIO TRCR ETA TIER1RATIO TRCR 
CAPITAL (-1) -0.029 -0.028 -0.027 -0.033 -0.022 -0.022 
 
(0.038) (0.027) (0.023) (0.038) (0.027) (0.023) 
LCR (-1) -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008** -0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
NSFR2014 (-1) 
   
-0.009*** -0.009** -0.009*** 
    
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
ROAA (-1) -0.058 -0.053 -0.037 -0.029 -0.036 -0.013 
 
(0.093) (0.094) (0.086) (0.093) (0.093) (0.086) 
CIR (-1) 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
NPL_GL (-1) 0.052* 0.062** 0.053* 0.040 0.051* 0.041 
 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) 
DIV (-1) -0.011*** -0.009** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.010** -0.011*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
SIZE (-1) 0.262*** 0.186*** 0.224*** 0.233*** 0.166*** 0.199*** 
 
(0.050) (0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.047) (0.046) 
GDPC (-1) -0.228*** -0.266*** -0.237*** -0.228*** -0.261*** -0.236*** 
 
(0.038) (0.045) (0.043) (0.039) (0.045) (0.042) 
INFC (-1) -0.021 -0.040 -0.048 -0.019 -0.032 -0.043 
 
(0.064) (0.079) (0.075) (0.063) (0.078) (0.074) 
HHI (-1) -1.529* -3.217*** -2.892*** -1.557* -3.241*** -2.956*** 
 
(0.879) (0.983) (0.957) (0.883) (0.976) (0.953) 
D_EuroZone 0.325* 0.318 0.337* 0.287 0.289 0.311 
 
(0.195) (0.209) (0.204) (0.194) (0.209) (0.204) 
D_year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of obs. 1,980 1,316 1,387 1,980 1,316 1,387 
Pseudo R-squared 0.203 0.1817 0.1823 0.208 0.1851 0.1862 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 11. Logistic estimations results in countries with F&D banks  
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of pooled logistic regressions focusing only on those EU 28 member 
states that have both active and F&D banks over the period 2004-2013 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom). The dependent variable is the failed and 
distress bank dummy variable (F&D) that takes value of 1 when a bank i failed or experiences financial distressed in 
time period t and 0 otherwise banks. Capital (ETA, TIER1RATIO or TRCR) and liquidity ratios (NSFR2014 or 
NSFR2010) are our target variables. As explanatory variables we also include the other CAMELS covariates (ROAA, 
CIR, NPL_GL, and DIV), the control variables (SIZE, GDPC, INFC and HHI), and the Euro Zone dummy variable 
(D_EuroZone). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year, except D_EuroZone. The dependent variable and 
independent variables are defined in Section 4. All variables are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Year dummy 
variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, 
and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed 
tests. 
 
Variables 
ETA and 
NSFR2014 
TIER1RATIO and 
NSFR2014 
TRCR and 
NSFR2014 
ETA and 
NSFR2010 
TIER1RATIO and 
NSFR2010 
TRCR and 
NSFR2010 
                     CAPITAL (-1) -0.026 -0.059 -0.072 -0.026 -0.059 -0.073 
 
(0.035) (0.027) (0.027) (0.035) (0.027) (0.027) 
LIQUIDITY (-1) -0.005* -0.004* -0.004* -0.005* -0.003* -0.003* 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROAA (-1) -0.093 0.002 0.017 -0.092 0.002 0.017 
 
(0.096) (0.107) (0.102) (0.097) (0.107) (0.103) 
CIR (-1) -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
NPL_GL (-1) 0.108*** 0.148*** 0.154*** 0.110*** 0.150*** 0.156*** 
 
(0.037) (0.042) (0.042) (0.037) (0.042) (0.042) 
DIV (-1) -0.007* -0.002 -0.002 -0.007* -0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
SIZE (-1) 0.167*** 0.184*** 0.186*** 0.164*** 0.185*** 0.187*** 
 
(0.048) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) 
GDPC (-1) -0.129** -0.077 -0.055 -0.131** -0.079 -0.057 
 
(0.060) (0.066) (0.067) (0.059) (0.066) (0.067) 
INFC (-1) 0.452*** 0.447*** 0.478*** 0.456*** 0.444*** 0.476*** 
 
(0.136) (0.149) (0.152) (0.136) (0.148) (0.151) 
HHI (-1) 4.941*** 7.573*** 7.505*** 4.919*** 7.494*** 7.412*** 
 
(1.556) (2.037) (2.023) (1.558) (2.021) (2.006) 
D_EuroZone 0.068 0.097 0.031 0.093 0.102 0.038 
 
(0.221) (0.249) (0.251) (0.222) (0.249) (0.252) 
D_years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       N. of obs. 1,500 1,005 1,013 1,500 1,005 1,013 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2195 0.1941 0.1963 0.2194 0.1938 0.1960 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Logistic estimations results with second and third lag 
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of pooled logistic regressions on the full sample over the period 2004-
2013, including the second and the third lag of our target variables. The dependent variable is the failed and distress 
bank dummy variable (F&D) that takes value of 1 when a bank i failed or experiences financial distressed in time 
period t and 0 otherwise banks. Capital (ETA) and liquidity ratios (NSFR2014 or NSFR2010) are our target variables. 
We show only the results with the capital ratio proxied by ETA. However, we obtain very similar results using 
TIER1RATIO or TRCR rather than ETA. As explanatory variables we also include the other CAMELS covariates 
(ROAA, CIR, NPL_GL, and DIV), the control variables (SIZE, GDPC, INFC and HHI), and the Euro Zone dummy 
variable (D_EuroZone). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year, except the dummies variables. The dependent 
variable and independent variables are defined in Section 4. All variables are winsorized at the 1% of each tail. Year 
dummy variables are also included in the model. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts 
***, **, and * denote coefficients statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-
tailed tests. 
 
Variables ETA and NSFR2014 ETA and NSFR2010 
(I) (II) (I) (II) 
CAPITAL (-2) 0.004 
(0.022) 
 0.006 
(0.021) 
 
CAPITAL (-3)  0.016 
(0.019) 
 0.018 
(0.019) 
LIQUIDITY (-2) -0.006*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.003 
(0.002) 
 
LIQUIDITY (-3)  -0.007*** 
(0.002) 
 -0.004 
(0.002) 
ROAA (-2) -0.234** 
(0.112) 
 -0.249** 
(0.113) 
 
ROAA (-3)  -0.391*** 
(0.150) 
 -0.408*** 
(0.151) 
CIR (-2) 0.001 
(0.004) 
 0.001 
(0.004) 
 
CIR  (-3)  -0.0005 
(0.907) 
 -0.0009 
(0.004) 
NPL_GL (-2) 0.031 
(0.027) 
 0.035 
(0.027) 
 
NPL_GL (-3)  0.031 
(0.030) 
 0.034 
(0.029) 
DIV (-2) -0.008*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.008** 
(0.003) 
 
DIV (-3)  -0.005** 
(0.003) 
 -0.005* 
(0.003) 
SIZE (-2) 0.169*** 
(0.041) 
 0.179*** 
(0.042) 
 
SIZE (-3)  0.139*** 
(0.041) 
 0.144*** 
(0.041) 
GDPC (-2) -0.164*** 
(0.037) 
 -0.166*** 
(0.037) 
 
GDPC (-3)  -0.120*** 
(0.039) 
 -0.122*** 
(0.039) 
INFC (-2) -0.029 
(0.054) 
 -0.029 
(0.053) 
 
INFC (-3)  -0.020 
(0.051) 
 -0.019 
(0.050) 
HHI (-2) 0.550 
(0.904) 
 0.539 
(0.908) 
 
HHI (-3)  1.533* 
(0.075) 
 1.565* 
(0.886) 
D_EuroZone 0.634*** 
(0.190) 
0.978*** 
(0.205) 
0.643*** 
(0.189) 
0.985*** 
(0.203) 
D_years Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N. of obs. 1,706 1,449 1,706 1,449 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1412 0.1186 0.1387 0.1165 
 
Table 13. Logistic estimations results with dummy crisis 
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of pooled logistic regressions on the full sample over the period 2004-
2013. The dependent variable is the failed and distress bank dummy variable (F&D) that takes value of 1 when a bank i 
failed or experiences financial distressed in time period t and 0 otherwise banks. Capital (ETA, TIER1RATIO or 
TRCR) and liquidity ratios (NSFR2014 or NSFR2010) are our target variables. As explanatory variables we also 
include the other CAMELS covariates (ROAA, CIR, NPL_GL, and DIV), the control variables (SIZE, GDPC, INFC 
and HHI), the Euro Zone dummy variable (D_EuroZone), the Subprime crisis dummy variable (D_SubCrisis) and the 
Sovereign Debt dummy crisis (D_SovCrisis). All explanatory variables are lagged by one year, except the dummies 
variables. The dependent variable and independent variables are defined in Section 5. All variables are winsorized at the 
1% of each tail. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The superscripts ***, **, and * denote coefficients 
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
Variables ETA and NSFR2014 T1R and NSFR2014 TRCR and NSFR2014 ETA and NSFR2010 T1R and NSFR2010 TRCR and NSFR2010 
CAPITAL (-1) -0.025 -0.026 -0.032 -0.025 -0.027 -0.033 
 
(0.036) (0.027) (0.024) (0.036) (0.027) (0.024) 
LIQUIDITY (-1) -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.006** -0.007** -0.007*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROAA (-1) -0.112 -0.128 -0.101 -0.111 -0.128 -0.099 
 
(0.083) (0.089) (0.081) (0.083) (0.090) (0.082) 
CIR (-1) 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
NPL_GL (-1) 0.051* 0.055* 0.042 0.053* 0.057* 0.044* 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) 
DIV (-1) -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
SIZE (-1) 0.227*** 0.172*** 0.200*** 0.223*** 0.167*** 0.193*** 
 
(0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.045) (0.044) 
GDPC (-1) -0.089*** -0.093*** -0.086*** -0.091*** -0.095*** -0.090*** 
 
(0.023) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.026) 
INFC (-1) 0.142*** 0.181*** 0.165*** 0.146*** 0.184*** 0.170*** 
 
(0.050) (0.058) (0.057) (0.050) (0.058) (0.057) 
HHI (-1) -0.943 -2.444*** -2.267** -0.991 -2.519*** -2.364*** 
 
(0.832) (0.890) (0.885) (0.834) (0.893) (0.887) 
D_EuroZone 0.584*** 0.594*** 0.602*** 0.604*** 0.613*** 0.622*** 
 
(0.191) (0.200) (0.198) (0.190) (0.200) (0.198) 
D_SubCrisis 1.338*** 2.364*** 2.403*** 1.318*** 2.343*** 2.379*** 
 
(0.349) (0.615) (0.615) (0.350) (0.615) (0.615) 
D_SovCrisis 2.090*** 3.362*** 3.428*** 2.059*** 3.331*** 3.396*** 
 
(0.328) (0.601) (0.601) (0.330) (0.601) (0.601) 
N. of obs. 1,982 1,472 1,566 1,982 1,472 1,566 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1887 0.2058 0.2096 0.1887 0.2057 0.2100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 
Table A.1. NSFR calculation 
 
This table summarises the weights for each asset and liability items used to compute the last version of the NSFR of 
October 2014 and the previous version of December 2010. NSFR is computed as the ratio of Available Stable Funding 
(ASF) to Required Stable Funding (RSF). In bold are highlighted the differences between the two versions of NSFR. 
We calculate NSFR using the publicly data available in BankScope.  
 
ASF factor 
2014 
BankScope Liability & Equity Items ASF factor 
2010 
BankScope Liability & Equity Items 
100% Total equity 
Total long-term funding 
100% Total equity 
Total long-term funding 
 
95% Customer deposits savings 
Customer deposits term 
90% Customer deposits savings 
Customer deposits term 
 
90% Customer deposits current 80% Customer deposits current 
 
50% Other deposits and short-term borrowings 50% Other deposits and short-term borrowings 
 
0% Deposits from banks 0% Deposits from banks 
RSF factor 
2014 
BankScope Asset Items RSF factor 
2010 
BankScope Asset Items 
0% Cash and due from banks 0% Cash and due from banks 
Loans and advance to banks 
 
5% Government Securities 5% Government Securities 
 
50% Other securities (= Total Securities –
government securities – at-equity 
investments in associates) 
Loans and advance to banks 
 
50% Other securities (= Total Securities –
government securities – at-equity 
investments in associates) 
65% Residential mortgage loans 65% Residential mortgage loans 
 
85% Net loans  
   – residential mortgage loans 
85% Net loans  
   – residential mortgage loans 
 
100% 
Reserve for impaired loans/NPLs 
Non-earning assets (=total assets – total 
earning assets – cash and due from banks) 
Fixed assets 
Other earning assets 
Insurance assets 
Investments in property 
At-equity investments in associates 
100% 
Reserve for impaired loans/NPLs 
Non-earning assets (=total assets – total 
earning assets – cash and due from banks) 
Fixed assets 
Other earning assets 
Insurance assets 
Investments in property 
At-equity investments in associates 
 
5% Off-balance sheet items 5% Off-balance sheet items 
 
    
    
    
    
    
    
 
 
 
 
Table A.2. The representativeness of the sample  
This table illustrates the distribution of the full sample by country and its representativeness both over the period 2004-
2013 and in 2013. We compare aggregate total assets of banks included in our sample with aggregate total assets of the 
whole banking system. Column I shows the total number of banks by country, over the sample period. Column II shows 
the number of large banks observed by the EBA in the EU-wide stress testing 2014, by country. The full sample covers 
the 28 EU member states and includes the 123 large banks subjected to the EBA stress test 2014 exercise. * Norway is 
part of the European Economic Area (EEA) and as such the country is considered by EBA in its stress test exercise. We 
do not include it in the full sample as not a EU member state. 
 
 I II III 
Country N. of banks 
2004-2013 
 
N. of  large banks  
 (EBA stress test) 
Total assets of banks in the full  
sample / total assets of the whole 
banking system (%) 
2004-2013 2013 
Austria 26 6 36.62 60.24 
Belgium 11 5 42.01 70.13 
Bulgaria 7 0 71.33 83.25 
Croatia 5 0 55.90 75.06 
Cyprus 5 3 43.99 83.24 
Czech Republic 4 0 66.53 85.15 
Denmark 25 4 36.14 57.23 
Estonia 2 0 68.77 75.38 
Finland 9 1 88.47 98.75 
France 54 11 59.41 76.31 
Germany 51 24 59.39 67.87 
Greece 21 4 70.51 98.36 
Hungary 9 1 55.24 76.04 
Ireland 5 3 37.80 66.12 
Italy 72 15 79.49 90.68 
Latvia 8 1 12.95 38.48 
Lithuania 3 0 32.76 - 
Luxembourg 7 2 61.81 72.86 
Malta 1 1 39.09 45.93 
Netherlands 19 6 43.74 87.42 
Norway*  1   
Poland 13 6 62.23 68.13 
Portugal 17 3 82.84 91.46 
Romania 9 0 53.38 72.11 
Slovakia 4 0 75.63 73.32 
Slovenia 6 3 43.78 60.34 
Spain 80 15 82.79 90.20 
Sweden 12 4 64.75 65.88 
United Kingdom 28 4 54.23 67.88 
Total 513 123 56.48 73.99 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A.3. Variable Definitions 
 
This table reports variable definitions. Data used to compute the variables based on accounting data are from 
BankScope database. The macroeconomic factors (GDPC and INFC) are collected by the World Economic Outlook 
database of the International Monetary Fund. 
 
Variable Definition Expected sign 
Target variables:  
ETA The ratio of equity to total assets. NEGATIVE 
TIER1RATIO The ratio of tier1 capital to risk weighted assets. NEGATIVE 
TRCR The ratio of tier1 and tier 2 capital to risk weighted assets. NEGATIVE 
NSFR2014 The ratio of available stable funding to required stable funding as defined 
by the new final Basel III version of October 2014. 
NEGATIVE 
NSFR2010 The ratio of available stable funding to required stable funding as defined 
by the original Basel III document of December 2010. 
NEGATIVE 
The other determinants of bank F&D:  
ROAA The ratio of net income to average total assets. NEGATIVE 
CIR The ratio of overheads to the sum of net interest income (defined as the 
difference between gross interest & dividend income and total interest 
expense) and other operating income. 
POSITIVE 
NPL_GL The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. POSITIVE 
DIV The ratio of non-interest income to net operating revenue. Non-interest 
income is equal to the sum of net gains (losses) on trading and 
derivatives, net gains (losses) on other securities, net gains (losses) on 
assets at fair value through income statement, net insurance income, net 
fee and commissions and other operating income. Net operating revenue 
is equal to the sum of total non-interest income and net interest income. 
NEGATIVE 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets. POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 
GDPC The annual percentage change of GDP. NEGATIVE 
INFC The annual percentage change of inflation. POSITIVE 
HHI The sum of the squared market share value (in term of total assets) of all 
banks in the country. 
POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 
D_EuroZone Equals 1 for banks belonging to the euro area, 0 otherwise POSITIVE 
 
 
 
 
 
